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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

UNESCO REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION CONCERNING FREEDOM

UNESCO decided to entrust the 1950 research project on freedom to the International Federation of Philosophical Societies. Our Federation could not fail to respond to this appeal for an impartial investigation by experts into "fundamental concepts in present-day ideological conflicts." The text of the resolution in the UNESCO program for 1950 instructed the Director General "to procure the collaboration of international organizations able to pursue a research project:

(1) to analyze and define the principal meanings that the concept of freedom has assumed in the history of political philosophy and in the philosophy of law,
(2) to determine the present effect of this concept,
(3) to evaluate the importance of the role that this concept may play in current ideological conflicts,
(4) to give suitable publicity to the results of this project."

This resolution, while giving a very definite meaning to the purpose of the inquiry, put on us the complex task of bringing the different aspects of freedom into relation with one another.

The timeliness of the topic proposed by UNESCO for its third investigation is proved by the role which the concept of freedom has played in recent philosophical conventions and by the number of books, collections, and pamphlets devoted to this subject since the last war. We shall only mention the essays whose titles have been collected in a memorandum presented by M. Jacques Havet, entitled "Some Problems Concerning Freedom":[1]

Autour de la nouvelle Déclaration universelle des Droits de l'Homme, texts gathered by UNESCO, Éd. du Sagittaire, Paris.
Human Rights, being an English translation of the preceding, Allan Wingate, London.

[1] This work has been of great help to us in working out replies to the questionnaire. We should like also to express our gratitude to Mlle. Suzanne Delorme of the International Institute of Philosophy, who helped us greatly by summarizing the answers received and by assisting in the preparation of this report.

Democracy in a World of Tensions, The University of Chicago Press.

Les Études Philosophiques, 3rd year, No. 2, April–June 1948, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.

Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 2nd year, No. 6, Brussels.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. VIII, No. 4, June 1948, Buffalo, N. Y.

Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy, Amsterdam, 1949; in particular, "Colloquia of UNESCO," pp. 99–150.

Le Droit à l'Éducation dans le Monde actuel, by JEAN PIAGET, Éd. Sciences et Lettres, Liège, 1949.

Liberté de l'Information, by LYMAN BRYSON, *ibid.*, 1950.

Liberté de la Science, by BART BOK, *ibid.*, 1949.

Liberté de la Création littéraire et artistique, by REX WARNER, *ibid.*, 1950.

"Discussion and Resolution in Political Conflicts," by RICHARD MCKEON, in *Ethics*, Vol. LIV, No. 4, July 1944.

Freedom of the Press, by WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING, The University of Chicago Press, 1947.

We call attention also to a volume that appeared in 1940, entitled *Freedom, Its Meaning* (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 686 pp.), in which the editor, Ruth Nanda Anshen, collected the interpretations given by forty thinkers from all parts of the globe (among them Croce, Einstein, Russell, Haldane, Bergson) and a summary "Epilogue" by Herbert W. Schneider entitled "The Liberties of Man," pp. 653–672. Furthermore, the Fourth Congress of the Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française, held at Neuchâtel during September 1949, had as its theme "Liberty." More than sixty authors contributed to the Acts of this Congress (published by Éd. La Baconnière, Neuchâtel, 1949), and several of these authors have also answered our questionnaire. That the number of answers received did not exceed sixty and that, to our regret, some outstanding thinkers did not answer our appeal, can be explained, in our opinion, by the fact that many of them have already published their views on this vital subject of contemporary thought. Indeed, several among those who sent answers refer to works on this topic which have already been published or are in process of publication.

In the account that follows, quotations remain anonymous.[2] The authors will thus remain entirely free to use their several con-

[2] The passages which have been placed in quotation marks are either taken from the actual text of an answer or summarize it as faithfully as possible.

tributions elsewhere. We shall, however, make two exceptions in the cases of answers coming from two leading persons who have greatly helped us to clarify our views and to master the somewhat disparate material at hand.

(A) M. Émile Bréhier sent us valuable remarks on the successive meanings assumed by the term "liberty" in the history of Western thought. Here follows a brief summary of his account: The idea of liberty appeared in Greece, and its *first* meaning was purely political and social. Understood thus, it designates that complex of attributes included in the epithet "liberal." During the period of political decadence which followed the reign of Alexander, liberty acquired an inner and spiritual meaning. It signified the liberation from the passions and the emotions. It described the independence of the wise man. Christianity brought an entirely different meaning, namely, *free will,* i.e., the liberty to choose between good and evil. This idea allows acts to be imputed to agents and makes men responsible individually. M. Bréhier asserts that free will can have no meaning outside of a Christian theology or one that derives its inspiration from similar sources. Yet the Stoic meaning survives in the Christian world and exists side by side with the theological meaning. The social complexities of our age have posed the problem in a new form. Should the modern state aim at the emancipation of the individual or should it lead to a new form of slavery, in which the individual will exist only as an instrument of society? In any case, liberty is neither an organ nor a thing; it is always the object of a desire and of a reasonable will, and it must be won and preserved continually. "Men often reason as if the fundamental liberties could be decreed like a law: yet, while it is possible to force man to respect the freedom of his fellows, it is impossible to force him to be free."

(B) Professor Richard McKeon, whose work and whose active participation in the preceding UNESCO investigations are well known, has sent us a substantial answer which, because of its extent and especially because of the exactness of its information and its powers of synthesis, also deserves, in our opinion, to be summarized briefly at the beginning of this report. It is to be hoped that this treatise will eventually be published *in extenso.*

In his introduction to *Philosophical Differences and the Issues of Freedom,* the author reminds us how difficult it has proved to come to an agreement about the philosophic bases of the rights of man. The search for eventual principles consisting either in inalienable rights based on human nature or in the evolution of society which, under specific circumstances, determines rights that are actually claimed, has led merely to the elaboration and to the

strengthening of contradictory philosophic principles. On the other hand, no difficulty arose in the way of an agreement on a list of rights and on a plan designed to coördinate them. It was therefore concluded that the philosophic problem consists, not in reaching a doctrinal agreement, but rather in obtaining an agreement on the rights themselves and in setting up the defense of these rights on the basis of very different principles. The report on the rights of man did not seek, therefore, to reduce their interpretation to a single formula. The members of the Committee decided to reach a "working formula" (cf. McKeon, *Human Rights. Comments and Interpretations*, New York, 1949).

The investigation concerning Democracy faced a similar problem. (Cf. McKeon, *Democracy in a World of Tensions*, Chicago, 1950.) The author finds that in contemporary society there are no democracies and no anti-democracies, since all parties invoke the same democratic ideal; within this common agreement, however, differences subsist. They have to do chiefly with the questions of liberty and of tolerance toward dissenting opinions. The biggest problem confronting the UNESCO Committee was the relation between the traditional democratic rights and the social and economic rights newly proclaimed in the XIXth and the XXth century. The list of rights is split into two rigorously distinct parts: on the one hand such rights as freedom of religion and freedom of speech, which guarantee the individual's independence, and on the other such rights as liberation from poverty and fear, which require the active participation of other human beings and depend, in the long run, upon a world organization.

Examining Hegel's dialectics, the author draws attention to the fact that to him freedom means something more positive than the mere absence of fear; it consists in the acceptance of duty. Hegel establishes an intimate relation between historical development and the dialectics of truth. The Spirit ("Geist") is defined in terms of its opposite, Matter. For the essence of matter lies outside of it, whereas the spirit is "self-containing existence" (*bei sich*), which is precisely liberty. History could not be outside of God, it is essentially his work.

The same linking of concepts takes place in dialectical materialism. Marx teaches that true freedom will have been achieved when men have learned to regulate material production for the satisfaction of their needs. Karl Mannheim recognizes several stages in social evolution. The first of these was to accept social conditions as fate (fatalism). In the second, man rises above his fate (ethics of conscience). In the third, social relations no longer escape investigation, they even become predictable. Politics is replaced by

administration. Contemporary thinkers such as Harold Laski and Benedetto Croce differ on the subject of an eventual reaffirmation of liberalism (proclaimed by Croce and opposed by Laski).

After having defined the doctrines of St. Augustine, Rousseau, and Kant, the author goes back to Plato and to the Stoics. He quotes a famous passage from Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum:* "Indeed, what is liberty? The ability to live as one desires. But who lives as he desires, excepting the man who follows the rules of equity, is happy to do his duty, . . . who does not obey the laws out of fear, but observes them and respects them because he judges this conduct to be more salutary, . . . to whom Fortune, whose power is said to be supreme, submits if, as the wise poet said, every one models his destiny on his own behavior?"

Noting that the English language possesses two terms for the word *Liberté, Freedom* and *Liberty,* the author quotes R. B. Perry's definition: "By freedom I mean enlightened choice. . . . Liberty has to do with the action of circumstances upon man. *I recognize the fact that freedom and liberty interact upon each other.*" The author concludes his valuable historical account by examining the theories of liberty in Aristotle, J. S. Mill, and Dewey. He then draws up a synthetic conclusion which forms the fourth paragraph of his report. In it Mr. McKeon establishes the fundamental distinction between two interpretations of liberty that leads to the core of current problems: the *dialectical* interpretation of the schools of Hegel and Marx, and the *circumstantial* interpretation of empiricism. He points out the advantages and the weaknesses of each. The dialectical interpretation connects the real with the ideal, whereas the circumstantial interpretation reduces the ideal to the real without going beyond it. Both need to complete each other and to interpenetrate.

We believe that the unerring scholarship and objectivity of the historian of thought, illustrated by Émile Bréhier's contribution, and the broad synthesis which crowns Richard McKeon's copious exposition should stand as examples for all investigations striving to combine a clear awareness of the ideal with precise concepts and with firmly grounded knowledge.

* * *

This investigation reveals itself, upon further reflection, to be quite complex. Its numerous and complicated aspects are reflected in the answers that we received. In order to avoid a disorganized enumeration, it has seemed preferable to us to offer a systematic scheme of the chief problems raised by the term "liberty." The answers received will be fitted into this scheme as illustrations.

The reader will find in this report the main trends emerging in the answers. We shall take the liberty to insist on some aspects that did not receive, on the part of the authors, all the attention which they seemed to deserve. This appears all the more necessary since most of the authors make a personal choice among the problems concerning freedom, and center them on the deepest concerns of their own thinking. Such a selection is completely natural, since the term "liberty" covers fields that differ widely. We shall first establish the fundamental meanings in which the term is used, and then proceed to outline the relationships that connect them. The prime difficulty in examining the various concepts of freedom lies in the fact that all the senses of the term base themselves on inner experiences which language does not find it easy to express.

I. Physical and vital liberty. The terms "free" and "freedom" may be used in the case of certain inanimate phenomena. It is said that a spring is not free enough, and that a gas frees itself. These expressions are, of course, metaphors. They teach us nothing about the real nature of the phenomena involved, but merely refer back to the human experiences that constitute their point of departure. Man and, generally speaking, all living beings experience psychosomatic states of oppression and discomfort from which they tend to free themselves. These states can be determined by external factors, such as lack of air, certain odors, excessive noise, the presence of undesirable individuals, as well as by factors conditioned by the body itself. One may feel uncomfortable owing to an empty or a heavy stomach, to a wrinkle in the sheet on which one is lying, or to a garment that has become too tight, and one will try to free oneself from these conditions by means of actions leading to a feeling of comfort and tranquillity. In all these cases—and they are extremely varied—one will speak of liberation from inconvenience or pain when one succeeds in eliminating the physical or the psychosomatic disturbance.

Several of those who sent us answers set apart this "external" freedom which consists, negatively speaking, in the urge to free oneself from factors causing inconvenience or pain, and, positively, in the exercising of the natural function of behaving as one pleases and, more generally, of being "free as a bird in the air." For man is a being endowed with inclinations to self-preservation and to the enjoyment of pleasures. Therefore the first liberty to which, impelled by nature, he aspires, is of a psychophysical order.

II. The freedom of compromise. Besides the elementary tendencies toward freedom, man is endowed with tendencies that drive him to meet his fellow men, whether he consider them as obstacles to the fulfillment of his desires or as means to satisfy them. In the

pursuit of material goods, a certain amount of compromise becomes necessary. One person will always own at the expense of others who own less, one will exercise power only if there are fellow men who submit, one will attain honors only on condition that there be others to admit their inferiority in talent or in accomplishments. To come into one's own on this plane, one needs the community; and the community in turn reduces one's satisfactions to construct a framework allowing the simultaneous existence of several tendencies aiming at the same goal. The reciprocal pressure of those who vie with each other for the conquest of economic or civic power, for domination and honors, necessarily creates a state of inequality which, although it tends to stabilize itself, will remain a permanent source of tension. In this state of affairs, respect for the rights of others, which induces the individual to curb his personal desires, assumes the character of a constraint complied with by calculation. The individual, measuring his forces against those which oppose him most, chooses the wisest course. His freedom consists in accomplishing the utmost within a network of forces opposing each other.

III. Moral freedom. The social order and the relative stability to which the struggle for power and domination leads, may impress the individual as a makeshift so long as he has not renounced his selfish tendencies. He will obey the laws out of fear. His freedom will be a relative one. However, another form of liberty arises: that of the honest and wise men who voluntarily accept the laws and, by this very acceptance, find a surer and higher freedom than the freedom of compromise. Socrates formulated this moral freedom when he said that the philosopher is the man who observes the laws for their own sake, independently of any thought of reward or punishment. During classical antiquity, moral liberty first consisted in obedience to the laws, which were conceived as being watched over by the gods. After the Sophists' critique, it consisted in voluntary obedience to the laws. Socrates was the initiator of that inner liberty which was to be preached later by the Stoics and which has remained an essential element of the notion of freedom in Western civilization. We shall return to this aspect of liberty in § V, in which the different analyses of moral freedom will be outlined. There too, we shall discuss the relation between moral and economic freedom.

IV. Freedom of conscience. It seems necessary to distinguish between moral liberty, which finds the material for its realization in the laws of society, and the freedom of a more individualized conscience, which finds its ultimate norm within itself and hence may come into conflict with the laws. For society may make demands on the individual which have weight for a conscience for-

mally ready to forsake the pursuit of its personal interests, but which are, materially, judged by the same conscience to be objectionable. The same Socrates who, in the *Crito,* professes toward the laws an attachment that goes so far as to dissuade him from saving his life by fleeing, refuses to obey when he must execute a command that goes against his conscience.

Although Greek philosophy, while maintaining the general principle of the agreement between moral liberty and the demands of the laws, already recognized problems of conscience, Christianity has singularly strengthened the role of the latter by teaching that one must "obey God before men." To the present day, Christianity has inspired acts of resistance against tyrannical and criminal governments and upheld the rights of the religious conscience by contempt for suffering and for death. In so doing, it has demonstrated how thoroughly wrong is the theory of Hegel which asserts that "the state is the substance of morality."

V. The struggle for moral and social freedom. Greco-Roman humanism and Christianity handed down to Western civilization the struggle for moral liberty. The humanist is an optimist who believes in the liberation of man and the spiritualization of his existence through will-power, which is the principle regulating the instincts and the impulses. Christianity in its Roman form teaches that divine Grace must needs concur with the will, whereas Protestantism is decidedly pessimistic. Despite these fundamentally divergent evaluations, humanism and Christianity together have reared Western society in the knowledge of a moral law which is to rule over egotistical tendencies and thus to enable the community of men to live together in justice. Yet the ideals of justice and of universal peace are far from being realized, and the last few centuries of Western history show greater injustice in the distribution of earthly goods and bloodier wars than have ever been known before. This state of affairs has made the problem of liberty, in all its meanings, particularly complex.

Man today, if he lives in a large city, constantly sees his vital liberty impeded by the narrowness of his environment, by noises of all kinds, and by a very noticeable dependence on those who cater to his primary needs for food, clothing, etc. Discomforts of this sort might still be overcome by training the will, which would teach individuals to be indifferent, while maintaining and upholding the moral law, the fulfillment of which gives promise of a higher freedom. However, the uneasiness has spread to the moral law itself, and it too has become problematic. There are consciences that revolt against all wars, even defensive. They note with despair that the sacrifices which this attitude entails do not in any way pre-

vent the preparation of new wars, and that the moral conscience of the immense majority of men accepts the notion that mankind must pass through bloody struggles in order to reach its apogee at last. Does national defense respect the individual's right to liberty when it calls young men to arms? Do the authorities that set the armies into motion ask the soldiers whether they approve the reasons for which war has been declared? Of course not, and thus it happens that millions of men, every one of whom, taken individually, is convinced of the inhuman and criminal character of war, as a group obey orders, and in so doing renounce the freedom of their conscience. There exist, in the structure of contemporary life, other hindrances that seem to paralyze the exercise of moral liberty. Life in past centuries has known forms of economic dependence that lent themselves to grave injustices, such as serfdom and slavery. Since the industrial revolution, a corresponding form of domination and slavery has arisen, unknown in former centuries: a concentration of economic power transcending the frontiers of nations in time of peace, and even in time of war, and an industrial proletariat.

Man today is afraid of:

(1) a national or a continental war which might be set off, without his being consulted, by those whom he has delegated to power. In the future, such a war would be intercontinental: one continent would impose it on the countries belonging to another continent. It would no longer, as in the past, present the character of a military action occurring outside the sphere of civilian life: it would be total.

(2) a revolution that would aim at abolishing the factors or structures which make wars inevitable. This revolution would itself take the form of an international war. These alternatives are not mutually exclusive. Such a revolution might eventually go on side by side with a conflict between the representatives of the traditional and of the new order.

In any case, man in our time feels threatened by these two possibilities of war. Because he considers one or the other inevitable, he is inclined to close his eyes to the danger which he is powerless to avert, and to view it as a fatality for which he declines all responsibility. Thus he is led to live from day to day, enjoying a happiness tainted with anxiety, and blessing every "free" day which seems to put off the impending disaster into the uncertainty of the future.

* * *

A good many of the answers received show concerns that gravitate around problems of this order. Most of the writers, it is true,

treat of moral liberty and of the struggle of man with himself, and imply that, in the last resort, all problems concerning liberty are of a personal order. The orientation of several of our correspondents, however, is decidedly political and economic. They do not try to solve the complicated knot in which the notions of responsibility and determinism, of liberty and fatality, intertwine; if they can be said to solve it, in a sense, it is because they turn outward, away from the microcosm of the personal struggle, toward the macrocosm of social realities that essentially determine the life of individuals: one must investigate and know these realities so that one may free oneself from them.

Along this line, one writer notes "Europe's pessimism, hemmed in between communism and totalitarian fascism," while another, having in mind the communist menace, exclaims: "if freedom were to die in the world, neither equality, nor security, nor prosperity would mean anything any longer." On this subject, the most diverse voices are heard. They seem to reflect the picture of a humanity striving for unity, but still grievously torn. One author, after expressing his preference for social love, already preached by Saint Paul in the *Epistle to the Galatians*, asks the question: "whether it is permissible to achieve supreme moral freedom by suppressing the existing freedom, even if it is the freedom of a dominant minority?" He then answers in the affirmative.

In the field of politics, the word "liberty" sometimes becomes the rallying cry for an attitude of defense in behalf of all that one wishes to preserve. Thus it happens that the defenders of economic freedom appear as champions of moral or spiritual freedom threatened by the regimentation of the modern state. The majority of those who mention economic freedom explicitly underline its dangers. Indeed it seems to us that to limit the desire for material gain is entirely compatible with, not to say the logical consequence of, moral liberty. A few voices, however, raise themselves in defense of economic freedom. Let us quote a French thinker who, under certain conditions, cautiously defends it, invoking arguments of a moral and a psychological nature: "Does not leaving it to the state to provide for you mean that you have renounced your responsibility? . . . Do we not risk a disappearance of all restlessness that would spread to our very spiritual life?"

The concern of the great majority of authors is realistic. How could it be otherwise, in a world where one feels that the yearning for liberties is hampered by forces that are in no way ideal or unreal? Nevertheless, a distant echo of the old, idealistic intellectualism is heard in the case of one author, who declares that the

problem of liberty is "of a purely speculative nature," and that the problem is to liberate conscience by means of thought, "whereupon the two great perspectives, liberalism and socialism," will fit in automatically.

Next to the description of bourgeois democracy as "an outdated society that prepares the socialist revolution," we note the numerous apologies for Western democracy as the most adequate expression of liberty. A British thinker defines the essence of democracy thus: man is not only a means, but an end in himself. The same writer declares himself in favor of preserving private ownership of personal belongings, while the state should control the means of production.

An answer coming from Switzerland frankly and vehemently criticizes liberalism, which has always defended economic liberty in close connection with the autonomy of the individual. The writer asks us "not to cling to liberal hypocrisies," and insists on the maintenance of the distinction between metaphysical liberty (the freedom of the act) and economic liberty.

The problem of economic order may seem very distant from the metaphysical interpretation of liberty. Yet the fact that this external and material aspect holds the attention of the many metaphysicians who wrote us, seems to indicate to what an extent, in our time, economic factors enter into the struggle. A clergyman's answer contains the following sentence: "The primary need of our age is for an economic and social order effectively promoting freedom for all." In our opinion, this is a most remarkable statement. It might serve as a basis for quite different orientations of thought. An Anglo-Saxon writer proposes the free discussion of communism in non-communist countries; an American, in turn, tells us that "Russians and Occidentals should get to know each other better." When another American reminds us that "democracy is a form of freedom, but not the only one," such a statement seems to indicate a desire for an understanding that would break through the usual limits of political distrust and isolation. One should not underestimate the value of this tendency toward an agreement both philosophic and practical, an agreement stopping at no boundaries, since it seeks to englobe all of mankind.

We note also that some writers started from their own country's history in their attempt to throw light on the contemporary problems of mankind. A Frenchman reminds us of the great values proclaimed by the Revolution of 1789. In his opinion, these universal values have not always been realized in the right proportions; too much emphasis has been placed upon Liberty, to the detriment of Equality and Fraternity. Comparing modern France

and modern Russia, he believes that "the seeds of fraternity should be sowed among us, whereas the seeds of liberty should be planted among the Russians, who, up to the present, have been concerned mainly with equality." A Swiss writer, treating the problem from the point of view of the jurist, proclaims that "Switzerland has chosen freedom," and that "the experience of it requires a dignity of living and the scrupulousness of the magistrates. . . . One must deserve it." Another Swiss writer reminds us of the need for organized freedom, based on respect for the freedom of others. It should be noted that the notion of duty is vitally connected with that of liberty.

It would be interesting to study systematically each country's contribution to Western civilization. Such a study would show, in our opinion, that each country has realized in exemplary fashion one or more of the values which, taken together, constitute the common patrimony of our civilization. Through ever more close contact, these values should become "denationalized," in order to prepare the united civilization toward which mankind is tending.

VI. Freedom and determinism. In the innermost reaches of his being, man feels himself free. He feels himself determined to act with regard to external circumstances. Freedom is not a faculty, but an act. These facts of experience are recognized by thinkers of very different outlooks. The problem of determinism arises when one passes from experience to reflection, from the immediate to its objectification. Reflection then comes up against experienced freedom, or rather against the way in which the latter interprets itself. The memory of freedom experienced in deed seems to object to being integrated into the context of reality in the form required by theoretical reflection.

Among the authors who concerned themselves with the theory of freedom and determinism, the following trends may be noted:

(1) the religious and metaphysical outlook,
(2) the psychological outlook.

A Canadian thinker revives the old thesis that "Reason sees the good clearly and necessarily induces the will to follow her. The free will stems from the self, which remains autonomous with regard to external determinations. To negate the spirit inevitably leads to materialism and to atheism." Another, following in the footsteps of Aristotle and the Scholastics, asserts that the innermost motivation of liberty is the pursuit of happiness, and that freedom, human and imperfect, tends toward the perfection which lies in God. Still another believes that there can be no freedom without transcendence. Most of the writers refuse to admit de-

terminism. Some categorically condemn it, affirming that "in a deterministic perspective, all moral notions disappear."

One writer explains the relation of determinism to liberty in terms of the relation of realism to idealism. Another apologist of liberty agrees with Nicolai Hartmann in saying: "it is sufficient that, among the many heteronomous determinations of liberty, there be one autonomous determinant"; and he agrees with Saint Thomas in saying that man is determined in nature, which does not contradict the freedom residing in the individual. Another writer, after having emphasized "the painful experiences we have when we behave freely," urges us to "dispel the negative illusions of freedom." A psychiatrist draws attention to the fact that "determinism does not oppose freedom, but free will." Free will has indeed fewer apologists than freedom. A philosopher of science reminds us that physical determinism involves the intervention of the human will to induce or prevent phenomena. "There exists, in the direction of the future, an availability of the universe, hence there is a place for liberty." An epistemologist defines the liberty that is implied in knowledge: "To be able to observe a fact, one must be free to think that it might not occur. . . . There exists at least one kind of freedom, so deeply ingrained in our being that one could not suppress it without cutting the very thread of our fate."

In the psychological studies of liberty, we note the idea that "the great enemy of freedom is fear, and that religion is capable of delivering us from it." Another writer declares that "only goodness of heart can lead to a true and to a social life." A few people underline "the essentially Christian origin of liberty."

"Moral freedom could not exercise itself without a certain amount of constraint." In fact, the word "constraint" is ambivalent: it means both an obstacle to liberty and a condition stimulating conduct. It is in the first sense that one writer uses it when he defines liberty as "a state of the conscious individual escaping all influences tending to force his behavior into channels chosen by others." Another uses it in the second sense when he speaks of "the discipline of freedom, which imposes normative restrictions." In the same line of thought a third writer states that liberty gains a positive character when it is limited by other persons. Determinism cannot be total, since there exist in every human being a spark of originality, a drive toward fulfillment, and a choice in favor of the higher and harder urge. He who engages himself is free; freedom and responsibility are therefore intimately connected.

Conclusions

Does the diversity of the statements received in answer to the questionnaire allow us to draw general conclusions? Here are some common features that, in our opinion, stand out:

(1) Liberty, in the sense of absence of constraint, is a blessing.

(2) There exists a moral liberty consisting in the fulfillment of personality. It displays the double character of an effort and of an impulse. In it resides man's dignity.

(3) Although moral liberty rests exclusively upon the energy with which the individual achieves it within himself,—and in this sense the truly free man does not depend on external circumstances—, the conscience of today accepts the evidence that the exercise of liberty is conditioned by circumstances. This evidence inspires all social and humanitarian movements.

(4) While agreement exists over the social principle implied by the individual's moral liberty, namely, that he is bound to help his fellow men and to create for them the conditions favorable to their fulfillment, there is disagreement on the subject of the role played in man's liberation by present economic systems. Adherents of the two great contrasting systems cast the same reproaches at each other. The one party considers economic freedom as one of the fundamental rights of the individual, and believes that it is in fact the very condition upon which the material and the moral health of a society depends. Therefore it denounces economic planning as a form of tyranny which must be fought against in the name of the sacred value of liberty. The other party asserts that the liberation of individuals can be guaranteed only by an economic structure devoid of the faults of individual profit-seeking.

(5) This disagreement is tragic, since on both sides moral forces are plentiful, but render each other powerless, to the detriment of mankind. And it will remain tragic as long as men are not animated by a sincere desire to meet in order to understand and to learn from each other.

(6) In this respect, it seems important to point out that several of our correspondents, considering the problem of freedom in the perspective of world peace, condemn war as a totally inadmissible solution.

(7) These considerations raise a question which goes beyond the scope of the investigation concerning freedom, and which might eventually lead to another investigation: In the current precarious situation of freedom and of peace, what practical role can be played by philosophers in warding off successfully the threat of a new

world war that would mean the irremediable destruction of freedom in all its forms?

POSTSCRIPT

The chief concern of the author of this report has been objectivity. He is, however, well aware of the fact that in the case of such a vital topic, involving the philosopher's feelings as well as his intellect, objectivity could not be synonymous with passive recording of the answers received. The presentation and the organization of the answers inevitably implied, on the part of the recorder, an interpretation of the problems involved. He hopes that his interpretation will not injure any of the answers received, each of which furnished one or more elements to the substance of his account. The author of this report should esteem himself satisfied if his statements were to give rise to intensified exchanges of views about the problems of freedom.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Philosophy of Democratic Government. Yves R. Simon. (Charles R. Walgreen Foundation Lectures.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1951. 324 pp. $3.50.

Into the modern discussion of democratic government Professor Simon attempts to insert principles which he derives from the philosophies of Aristotle and St. Thomas. His attempt raises two questions that are difficult to answer separately: to what extent does he render these principles applicable to modern prob-

lems, and to what extent do they thereby suffer such distortion that their derivation seems irrelevant to this application?

In his first chapter's "General Theory of Government," Professor Simon argues that the essential function of government is to secure unanimity whenever several courses of action are available as means to the common good. He assumes without argument that the common good itself has some fixed politically significant content. But this assumption is adopted by St. Thomas himself less with a view to its strictly political application than as an assumption which takes on its full significance only when the divine government of the universe is taken into account. For it is then recognized that men, despite their ostensibly different pursuits, are all ultimately determined to seek God as the common good and final cause of the universe. Aristotle, who does not explore this theological background in his political theory, finds it necessary to employ a classification of different kinds of government which is itself (in part) the specification of the different goods that men may seek in common.

Although he does not use this classification, Professor Simon makes the transition from his "General Theory of Government" to his second chapter on "Democratic Freedom" by adopting Aristotle's simpler distinction between political and despotic governments: "By calling 'political' the system which gives the governed a legal power of resistance, Aristotle implies that a community governed despotically is not in a genuine sense a state or a city." The implication is Aristotelian, but not the meaning attributed to the term "political." Legal arrangements are for Aristotle a function of the prevailing distribution of political power; to resist this power is to undertake to alter this distribution and hence these legal arrangements. The expression "legal power of resistance" does, however, have discernible meaning in St. Thomas, for whom the positive law should respect the higher laws which are the divine government's regulation of human pursuits and which, in certain extreme cases, will legalize resistance to the positive law. But Professor Simon largely neglects this legal theology, which supplies the Thomist political theory with most of its principles. The meaning which he actually attaches to the term "political" is modern rather than Thomist, since it permits him in this chapter to move through those areas of modern discussion where freedom has been defined with some reference to those enactments of the positive law itself which provide the governed with some recourse from the despotic abuse of governmental authority.

This modern discussion, however, tends towards that "perversion of democratic thought and emotion which endeavors to eliminate the substance of authority"; and in order to rectify this tendency, Professor Simon returns to Thomist principles in his third chapter on "Sovereignty in Democracy." His rectification takes the form of a transmission theory of sovereignty. This theory is not found in St. Thomas, but is worked out by his commentator Cajetan, and by Bellarmine and Suarez. What is, of course, not clear from their use of this theory, as a juridical formula that may justify the right of popular resistance to a government, is whether or not the "people" have the initial right not to transmit their sovereign authority to a government. Yet their discussion provides Professor Simon with a theory of democratic government as that political arrangement under which not all of the transmissible powers are in fact transmitted to the government. This seems a back-door approach to modern problems, inasmuch as democratic sovereignty becomes itself a perversion of, or at best an exception to, the normal application of the theory Professor Simon is reinstating.

The fourth chapter regards "Democratic Equality" as theoretically justifiable only in terms of the Thomist theory of the universality of human nature:

> On the basis of such a philosophy of universality, to speak of the common nature of men makes sense; to speak of a natural foundation for the brotherhood of men makes sense; to speak of natural rights makes sense; to speak of rights belonging to all men on account of the unity of their nature makes sense; to speak of equal justice for all makes sense; but none of those things makes any sense in the framework of a consistently nominalistic philosophy. If theoretical ideas were always allowed to unfold their consequences in the actual course of events, the universalism of the rights of man would not have come into historical existence at a time that was the golden age of nominalism. But the tendencies of a theory may be held in check by a conflicting moral environment. . . . In the course of the nineteenth century, changes in the moral situation gave nominalism a chance to assert its consequences with dreadful logic and efficacy. [P. 201.]

Such tracing of political history as ultimately a by-product of the history of epistemology has become so fashionable among Thomists as to appear fundamental to their modern applications of Thomist principles. But their reasoning seems treacherous. Even if we neglect the opposed but no less plausible intellectual histories according to which nominalism implies the uniqueness of each individual and therefore the political inappropriateness of any government's denying his claims upon its attention and tolerance, it cannot be gainsaid that St. Thomas himself, despite the universality he ascribes to human nature, envisages its possible degradation in individual instances and thus is able to "make sense" of natural

slavery and of the execution of heretics. Moreover, if he regards human nature as universal, his actual treatment of human nature itself and of the universe within which men with this nature find their place, their fulfillment or their degradation, is hierarchical. An interpretation which finds egalitarian political implications in St. Thomas' epistemology is at least as over-simplified as the opposed interpretation which finds that the hierarchical implications of his psychological, moral, and cosmological theories are so extensive that they not merely justify forms of governmental authority which might be rendered acceptable today, but also entail a feudal arrangement of society. The interpreter can emphasize either of these sets of implications at the expense of the other. And since St. Thomas' philosophy reconciles and absorbs the divergent formulae of previous philosophies, the interpreter can also usually discover and fasten upon some formulae which he finds congenial to his interpretation, and then expand by such emphasis the scope of their significance. There are further difficulties in interpreting and applying St. Thomas' political formulae. On the one hand, they are scattered throughout his philosophy, so that when the interpreter brings them together to compose a political theory, he is readily tempted to neglect their different contexts and to emphasize the general implications of St. Thomas' philosophy. On the other hand, these formulae receive their most precise application in St. Thomas' theory of divine government, so that to work out their humanistic corollaries in a political theory applicable to the secular problems of modern government is to enter an area of his philosophy where widely divergent interpretations become particularly feasible. Indeed the political history of Catholic governments and the intellectual history of Thomistic political theories are evidence of these divergencies that is more conclusive than the evidence which Professor Simon compiles, from the history of secular democracies and of secular democratic theories, in order to conclude that the version of St. Thomas he favors would provide the theoretical underpinnings needed to justify the operations of democratic government.

ROBERT CUMMING
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Evolutionary Thought in America. Edited by Stow Persons for the Special Program in American Civilization at Princeton University. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1950. x, 462 pp. $5.00.

In the academic year 1945–46 the eleven lectures which are here printed in expanded form were presented before the undergraduate

conference of the Program in American Civilization at Princeton University. Each year a series of lectures on some aspect of American civilization is given in this group; this is the second such series to be published. An earlier volume was devoted to *Foreign Influences in American Life* (reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. XLI (1944), pp. 669–671).

The present series is presented in two parts. In the first, three general statements on the theory of evolution are given by philosophers Scoon of Princeton and Northrop of Yale and zoölogist Dobzhansky of Columbia. Scoon and Northrop devote considerable space to indicating that the Darwinian hypothesis, which for most modern English and American writers is all of evolution, is, in more accurate historical perspective, only one of a number of evolutionary theories. Northrop points to the Aristotelian and Hegelian traditions of evolution as well as to the Darwinian, shows that each of these traditions has developed a social philosophy in accord with its natural philosophy, and is thereby led to insist on the desirability of a continuity between philosophy of nature and philosophy of culture. His advocacy of this position is persuasive. Most of what Scoon has to say is a rather simple historical survey leading to a similarly general overview of evolution. At one point, however, Scoon makes the startling suggestion that, although Christianity has in general favored that "belief in fixed, unchanging species that satisfied Western culture in the main for well over a thousand years" (p. 8), it has at its core an evolutionary eschatology. "The Christians combined with their dualism of matter and spirit an eschatological belief that God was constantly at work in His church in a process of regeneration which would culminate in the millennium; and thus while nature, including the natural man, was subject to the fixed forms given it at creation, the supernatural or spiritual part of man, including the specifically religious virtues, was the arena in which God worked a gradual perfection" (p. 9). This seems to me to be putting upon the concept of evolution as huge a burden as it has ever been asked to bear. Dobzhansky's lengthy article on "Genetic Nature of Differences Among Men," which concludes Part I, is a survey of the present status of the attempt to determine the principles of racial genetics. It is interesting to note the definition of "races" as "populations which differ in the frequencies of some genes" where "a population is a group of individuals cemented by intermarriage, and hence sharing a common treasury of genes" (p. 99). This apparently static definition is then broken down by the introduction of the modification that "in reality a race is merely an episode

in the process of evolutionary divergence of populations" (p. 102).

Part II contains eight articles on widely divergent aspects of "Evolutionary Thought in America" by as many writers. There are interesting differences of opinion among the contributors to this section which indicate that the definitive account of the impact of evolutionary theory in America has yet to be established. So, for example, Robert Faris, professor of sociology in the University of Washington, maintains that Darwin himself made a direct contribution to the theme of social evolution, while Edward S. Corwin, emeritus professor of jurisprudence in Princeton University, insists that Darwin made no such contribution. Again, Faris and Corwin differ on the relation of Walter Bagehot to American social thought: Corwin claims for Bagehot a social Darwinism akin to that of Lester F. Ward, whereas Faris associates Bagehot's theories with the unsocial Darwinism of William Graham Sumner. Corwin, on the whole, seems rather arbitrary and captious in some of his redefinitions and associations and to have used his assignment to present "The Impact of the Idea of Evolution on the American Political and Constitutional Tradition" as a platform for an attack on the concept of the welfare state, although his insistence that Darwinism had to be inverted in order to serve as a reformist ideology is a necessary reëmphasis. J. J. Spengler, in writing about "Evolutionism in American Economics, 1800–1946," wisely declines to overemphasize the importance of evolutionism for economic theory in America. His historical account is well groomed and interestingly presented.

E. G. Boring argues in detail that functionalism is the type of evolutionary psychology which developed in America because it most successfully expressed both evolutionary insights and the character of the American social environment. Malcolm Cowley's paper on "Naturalism in American Literature" emphasizes the literary sterility of evolutionary influences at the same time as it points to the usefulness of evolutionary naturalism as an agent in submerging the "genteel tradition." Donald Drew Egbert maintains that the concept of organic expression, "despite the fact that it is primarily a biological concept, naturalistic in tendency" (p. 389), has been influential both in the recent development of American architecture and in the acceptance of the architectural work of Wright, Gropius, and other modern American architects.

The last two essays are of particular interest to readers of this JOURNAL. William F. Quillian, Jr., writing on "Evolution and Moral Theory in America," shows very clearly how the immediate effect of evolution on American moral theory was in the direction of a reduction of morals to biology, while later and more sophisti-

cated naturalisms as well as recent idealisms have tended to regard morality in the light of emergent evolutionism as the expression of the evolution of a spiritual force. The editor, Stow Persons, in "Evolution and Theology in America," demonstrates the wide variety of evolutionary theologies which developed in late nineteenth-century America. Among the theologians, professional and amateur, that Persons discusses, it is particularly pleasant to be able to report a preliminary, brief examination of the Spencerianism of the Unitarian, Minot Judson Savage, as well as a summary of the theological views of Francis Ellingwood Abbot (supplementing Mr. Persons' discussion of Abbot in his *Free Religion—An American Faith*).

This collection of lecture-essays is a useful contribution to the literature on evolutionism in America. There are gaps in its pages; there is, for example, not one mention of Chauncey Wright, although Wright's projected "psycho-zoölogy" was the fruit of an agreement between Darwin and the American with respect to the legitimate extensions of the Darwinian theory. Some of the judgments are rather extraordinary; these have been noted particularly in reference to the Scoon and Corwin articles. On the whole, however, the symposium was fruitful and the editor is to be congratulated.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

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The Genesis of Georges Sorel; an Account of His Formative Period, Followed by a Study of His Influence. JAMES H. MEISEL. Ann Arbor, Mich.: The George Wahr Publishing Company. 1951. 320 pp.

Like Machiavelli, Sorel has achieved, in some circles, a reputation for evil which is altogether incommensurate with his intentions, or with the actual purport of his most famous (or infamous) work. The *Reflections on Violence,* partly through an unfortunate terminology and an imprecise statement, partly because it is usually read out of the context of its purpose and place in Sorel's thinking, lends itself, it is granted, to vicious misinterpretation. Prof. Meisel, in his *The Genesis of Georges Sorel,* seeks to rectify the disparity between the reputation and the actuality by locating the *Reflections* as an historical (and perhaps climactic) moment in the development of one of the most unorthodox and curious minds of modern political and moral thought. Thus, by considering the *Reflections* as one among the prodigious number of Sorel's writings, as a product of a number of attempts by Sorel to find a concept which would lend itself to his moralistic am-

bitions, much of the violence is removed from the notion of violence, and its content is more availably specified. The historical method is, perhaps, the most satisfactory method for getting at Sorel, for he was anything but a systematic or analytic theorist, and his books and articles, taken *in toto*, reveal an irregular sequence of involvements and rejections, of enthusiasms and anathemas, rather than a structured system of concept and explanation. Though his is not the first attempt to deal with Sorel's mind historically (one thinks, for example, of F. Cheydleur's early *Essai sur l'évolution des doctrines de M. Georges Sorel*), Prof. Meisel's treatment is, so far as I know, the most thorough and detailed one to date, superb in scholarship, sympathetic, and written with a light and lively touch. As such, it merits the warmest recommendations.

If there is to be found any unity at all in Sorel, it must obviously be sought in the personality of the thinker, rather than in the varied and often inconsistent productions of his spirit. Indeed, we must regard each of Sorel's phases, however inconsonant they may be with one another, as consecutive atempts to deal with one pervading problem, or family of problems. *The* Sorelian problem is, one might say, the problem of the moral redemption of society—how to achieve and maintain a non-decadent social structure. Various instruments to this end suggested themselves at various times to Sorel until, in the *Reflections*, a too literal reading of Vico and a too liberal reading of Marx drew him to envision the proletariat as the instrument to moral sublimity, and the myth of violence as the agency with which the proletariat might be provoked to a consciousness of its moral destiny. But herein lies an enigma (at least of personality) which Prof. Meisel would resolve: how is it that the bourgeois, retired civil servant Sorel, whose idea of morality often meant merely the homely virtues of hearth and chastity, should turn to the idea of violence in his old age? How should it ever occur to such a man that an heroic class-act must be the prelude to a society whose morality would at best be humdrum and vehemently middle-class? To answer the enigma, the author abandons his well-documented study for a plunge into the dubious metaphysics of *Zeitgeist*, and finds the notion of violence to be "expressive of a general contemporary thought process" (p. 128). As corroboration, he furnishes ingenious interpretations of two Strauss operas, and vague allusions to cubism and futurism—questionable analogues all, and hardly explicative of Sorel's attitude or insight. Aside from this odd lapse (unfortunately central to the book), readers will find an imaginative rendering of Sorel, his influencers (e.g., Proudhon, Marx, Bergson), his contemporaries (Croce, Pareto, Péguy), and his more or

less faithful disciples (Mussolini and Berth). And an obscure, if crucial figure in the history of political radicalism has been illuminated considerably.

A. C. DANTO

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Philosophie der Endlichkeit als Spiegel der Gegenwart. FRITZ-JOACHIM VON RINTELEN. Meisenheim/Glan: Westkulturverlag Anton Hain. 1951. xxiv, 490 pp. DM 22.50; bound, DM 26.50.

This admirable study of the intellectual malaise of Western Europe is further evidence that German philosophers have moved beyond the pamphleteering activities which the chaos of the post-war years forced upon them, without losing their sense of timeliness. Continuing a series begun by Professor von Rintelen in the *Dämonie des Willens* in 1947, it offers in addition to its carefully developed main argument a most adequate survey and criticism of contemporary existentialism, enlivened by a fine sensitivity to the human values in recent poetry. The unusual combination of clarity and grace of style makes its reading a distinct pleasure.

The burden of the argument is a defense of the full power and meaning of human personality, against its impoverishment by modern philosophies of finiteness, i.e., against all restrictions of the meaning of man to the boundaries of time and history. The three essential characteristics of persons neglected in finitistic systems are, according to the author, spiritual freedom, relation to a "thou," and decision, and these can be restored fully only by considering man's relation to a transcendent order.

Professor von Rintelen does not, however, develop his argument in any strict metaphysical form. His method is rather a searching examination of the literature of finiteness, with a view to discovering its failures in understanding human nature and to developing its hints of a transcendental order. This search begins with nineteenth-century positivism, but focuses in more detail upon Rilke's appealing but frustrated amalgam of vitalism and existentialism, and upon the shifts in Heidegger's thought from *Sein und Zeit* to the present.

Two points in the argument illustrate its force and its weaknesses. The first is the author's perceptive analysis of modern efforts to find the human values of transcendence within the finite itself—in a mystical or romantic exaltation of life, power, irrational will, or, increasingly, death itself. It should be noted that this tendency has not shown itself in the conceptions of man and value characteristic of naturalism in America. The second point in-

volves references in the existentialists to a rational order of transcendence, in Heidegger's appeal to the illumination of truth, in Jaspers' admission of logical functions moving beyond the temporal horizons of man, and in Marcel's doctrine that reason operates creatively upon the ontological mystery. Using these hints, and expanding them with the aid of the scholastic distinction between the lower intellect and the higher norm-setting reason, and affirming that joy is an original human inclination equal to anxiety, von Rintelen presents evidence for three transcendent principles—the reality of objective values, the necessity of love, and a metaphysical basis for freedom and decision.

The essential nature of the transcendent, however, still remains unrevealed, the argument having carried the reader only to a concrete theory of personality in an abiding ontological setting. We may hope that the fourth volume in Professor Rintelen's series will develop the ontological theme. It will be a pity if he neglects philosophies of temporalism and eternalism in the English and American tradition when he does so.

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Cartesian Studies. ALBERT G. A. BALZ. New York: Columbia University Press. 1951. vi, 328 pp. $4.50.

Descartes After Three Hundred Years. ALEXANDRE KOYRÉ. (The University of Buffalo Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1. Monographs in Philosophy, No. 2.) Buffalo, N. Y.: University of Buffalo. 1951. 37 pp.

Meditations. RENÉ DESCARTES. Translated, with an Introduction, by LAURENCE J. LAFLEUR. (The Little Library of Liberal Arts, No. 29.) New York: The Liberal Arts Press. 1951. xvi, 80 pp. $0.50.

All of these recent publications relating to Descartes lack the full flavor of original and exclusive publication. Professor Balz's book is composed of eleven essays published at intervals during more than twenty years. Professor Koyré's Fenton Foundation lecture at the University of Buffalo is also to serve as the Introduction to a new translation of Descartes in the series of Nelson Philosophical Texts. The translation of the *Meditations* by Professor Lafleur is indeed new, but the material is altogether familiar. Much ingenuity is shown by Professor Lafleur in producing a fluent English text from the multiplicity of Latin and French versions which have some claim to be considered as originals. Although the *Meditations* "contain the most thorough exposition and defense of Descartes' philosophy," the translator holds that "the Descartes

of the *Meditations* is both philosophically and scientifically less advanced than the Descartes of the *Discourse on Method.*"

Professor Koyré finds the *Discourse* a reply to Montaigne's *Essais.* "To the sad story told by Montaigne, the story of a defeat, Descartes opposes his own, the story of a decisive victory." All his beliefs were to be doubted, yet "it is no more probable that Descartes ever seriously doubted the existence of God, than that he ever doubted the value of mathematics." The ontological proof of God, and of God's veracity, is portrayed "as the ultimate foundation of our reasoning" and of our confidence in reason. For an atheist "to believe in his reason would be utterly unreasonable." The believer, however, is entitled to "measure" the validity of his ideas "according to the standard of clearness and distinctness on the one hand, and the principle of divine veracity on the other." Nevertheless there is one idea that, "though essentially unclear and indistinct, can claim absolute truth: this is the idea of the union between body and soul, the idea of the unity of the human being." This unity, says Professor Koyré, "is by no means understandable. . . . Incarnation of spirit, and not only of God, will forever remain a mystery."

It is the proper interpretation of the Cartesian dualism and union of mind and body which is the theme of the climactic essay by Professor Balz entitled "Man, Thomistic and Cartesian." In a sense it dominates all of his *Cartesian Studies,* which "are concerned in the main with the doctrines of Descartes concerning the nature of man" as displayed in the works of some of Descartes' successors, both followers and opponents. After Descartes, philosophy, "broadly speaking, tended more and more to make the theory of knowledge a precondition of all other efforts of philosophical speculation," and thus "Cartesian doctrine pervaded all efforts of the modern mind." After careful scrutiny of Thomistic man as portrayed by Gilson and Brennan, Professor Balz concludes that he can find no "really fundamental difference that opposes Thomistic and Cartesian man," athough there is a gulf between Platonic-Thomistic-Cartesian man and hylemorphic organismic man (p. 322).

The author's skillful explorations of some of the "collateral byways" as well as of the highway of Cartesianism are a welcome addition to the literature of French philosophy in English. His comments have wide ramifications in the direction of psychology, the history of science, and the history of ideas. Writing on "Clauberg and the Development of Occasionalism," he makes it clear that the early reaction called modern did not, as sometimes alleged, "involve a rejection of mediaevalism as such. . . . The radical

step taken with the inception of the modern point of view was a sundering of the mediaeval whole into two portions . . . that which is theological and that which is natural. . . . The mediaeval integration of theology and science, of God and nature, is abandoned. . . . The modern mind began with the assumption of the position that the study of nature could be conducted independently of theology and theology could flourish independently of the former type of investigation. . . . Knowledge (at least of nature) is taken to mean something for which mediaeval patterns of thought are useless. Theology becomes the horizon of the field of natural inquiry" (pp. 159–160).

In this new divided world, the Cartesians realized that man occupied a place in creation both "startling and unique. Nothing can be both matter and spirit. Nevertheless, man is both. He is therefore a unity of composition and not a unity of nature. Man alone represents this compresence of substances" (p. 200). Yet "from the accepted fact that man is a unity of composition whose terms are two antithetical substances, nothing whatever can be inferred concerning either spiritual or physical events or their interrelation" (p. 204). Professor Balz acquaints us with many of the variations played by Descartes' successors upon this vexing and revolutionary theme, the source of endless controversy and, some would say, of endless mischief in modern psychology and philosophy.

HAROLD A. LARRABEE

UNION COLLEGE

NOTES AND NEWS

We are deeply grieved to learn of the death of Dr. Simon L. Millner, President of the Spinoza Foundation. He died of a thrombosis at his home in New York City on January 14, at the age of 69.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

There is no similar journal in the field of scientific philosophy. It is issued fortnightly and permits the quick publication of short contributions, prompt reviews, timely discussions, notes on new books and other journals, and news of philosophic interest. The last five issues contain:

VOLUME XLVIII

No. 23. November 8, 1951.

Whitehead's Denial of Simple Location. WILLIAM P. ALSTON.

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